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A B S T R A C T
This study analyses the co-movements of net foreign asset accumulation, consumption,
real exchange rate, and real interest rate in a cross section of countries. Our sample covers
both industrial and developing economies, spanning 1981–2010 period. We ﬁnd that the
accumulation of net foreign assets is associated with increasing consumption and real
exchange rate appreciation. In a cross section of countries, when a country increases its net
foreign assets to GDP ratio by a one-standard deviation, consumption to GDP increases by
0.02% per year and real exchange rate appreciates by 2% per year. Consumption to GDP
responds more positively to net foreign asset accumulation in G7 countries, +0.1 to +0.2%
per year, while the response is smaller and negative in developing countries reporting a
0.02% per year. The real exchange rate appreciation, however, is about +3% per year in
developing countries and only about +0.2% per year in OECD countries.
 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Manifested by the concern over current account deﬁcits in the U.S. as well as the issue of global imbalances in recent
years, the accumulation of net foreign assets1 (NFA) in developing countries, particularly in emerging Asia, has received
much renewed attention from policymakers and academics. The debate over current account sustainability and global
imbalances has further intensiﬁedwhen theworldwitnessed the so-called greatmoderation inmacroeconomic adjustments
with strong economic growth, low ﬁnancial market volatility and more integrated global economy. Then, triggered by the
subprimemortgage crisis in the U.S. during 2008–09, the global economy fell into the period of a sharp decline in growth and
markedly higher ﬁnancial volatility. While the global economy has recovered since 2010 and the ﬁnancial volatility has§ Helpful comments and suggestions fromMichael Plummer (editor), an anonymous reviewer, Yutaro Oku and researchers at Nomura Research Institute,
Kazunori Koike, Professors Shujiro Urata, Naoyuki Yoshino, Glenn Otto, Jenny Corbett, Trevor Breusch, and participants at the meetings of ASEAN+3, Japan
Ministry of Finance in Tokyo, Korea Institute of Finance andMinistry of Strategy and Finance in Seoul, Australian National University, and University of New
South Wales are gratefully acknowledged.
* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: aswmchia@ntu.edu.sg (W.M. Chia), yj5@soas.ac.uk (Y. Jinjarak), prana@ntu.edu.sg (P. Rana), txie1@e.ntu.edu.sg (T. Xie).
1 As a measure of a country’s national wealth, net foreign asset is identiﬁed as the difference in the value of assets that a country owns abroad and the
value of domestic assets owned by foreigners. The net foreign asset position at any given point in time can be measured by its initial position plus
cumulative current account balances and cumulative net capital gains on cross-border positions in subsequent periods. See Lane andMilesi-Ferretti (2007)
for a detailed discussion on the measures of net foreign assets.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.asieco.2014.06.004
1049-0078/ 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
[(Fig._1)TD$FIG]
−
.
2
−
.
1
0
.
1
N
FA
/G
DP
 (g
rou
p G
DP
 w
eig
hte
d)
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
OECD Countries Developing Countries
A. Time−series plot by country group (GDP weighted)
AGO
ARG
BDI
BFA
BGD
BOL
BRA
BWA
CAF
CMR
CODCOG
COL
COM
CPV
CRI
CYP
DOM
DZA
ECU
EGY
ETH
FJI
GAB
GHA
GIN
GMB
GNB
GTM
GUY
HNDHTI
IND
IRN
JAM
JOR
KEN
LKA
LSO MAR
MDG
MLI
MOZ
MRT
MUS
WI
NAM
NER
NIC
NPL
PAK
PAN
PER
PNG
PRY
RWA
SEN
SLE
SLV
SYR
TCD
TGO
TTO
TUN
TWN
TZA
UGA
URY
VEN
ZAF
ZWE
AUS AUT
BEL
CAN
CHE
CHL DNK
ESP
FIN
FRA
GBR
GRC
IRL
ISR
ITA
MEX NLD
NOR
NZL
POL
PRT
SWE
TUR
USA
CHN
IDN
JPN
KOR
MYS
PHL
SGP
THA
−
1
0
1
2
G
ro
wt
h 
of
 N
FA
 1
99
6−
20
10
 (p
erc
en
t o
f G
DP
)
0 50 100 150
Capital/Labor 1996 (in thousands of int’l dollar)
B. Scatter plot of NFA/GDP growth and capital/labor ratio in 1996
Fig. 1. Trend of net foreign assets/GDP over time, and its association with capital/labor ratios (in thousands of international dollar).
Source: WDI, IIP, WEO, EWN, and Authors’ calculation.
W.M. Chia et al. / Journal of Asian Economics 34 (2014) 42–53 43fallen signiﬁcant since the immediate post-crisis years, a signiﬁcant amount of resources has been committed in solving the
liquidity problem in the public and private sectors in some troubled countries, as well as to create appropriate policy tools as
a preemptivemeasure. At present, there is still no consensus in the literature on how current account and asset accumulation
actually contributed to the problem in the ﬁrst place (see, for instance, Chinn, Eichengreen, & Ito, 2011). The question on how
countries should manage their current accounts, stock of foreign exchange reserves and net foreign assets has therefore
become an ever more challenging task to tackle in both the developed and emerging countries.
Byand large, the recentdiscussionsonnet foreignassets are framed into thecontextof ‘global imbalances,’ ‘sovereignwealth
funds,’ and ‘global saving glut.’2 Yet, against these important discussions is a state of current understanding on any
macroeconomic implicationsofnet foreignassetaccumulation,which remainsa challenge inboth the theoretical andempirical
literature. Past studies examined the role of net foreign asset accumulation, taking it either as given with respect to other
macroeconomic variables [for cross-country empirical evidence, see Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002) and Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2004)], or as an endogenous variable among several others [see for theoretical models and evidence of industrial
countries in Masson, Kremers, and Horne (1994), Cavallo and Ghironi (2002), Ghironi, Iscan, and Rebucci (2008)]. Related
strands of the literature focus on the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves [see Aizenman and Riera-Crichton (2008) and
Rodrik (2006)on thedeterminants andconsequencesofholding reserves]andcurrentaccountadjustment [seeFaruqeeandLee
(2008) and Debelle and Galati (2007) on the global distribution and relationship with trade and ﬁnancial integration].
Fig. 1A compares the size of net foreign asset relative to GDP betweenOECD group and developing countries.3While there
is a large cross-country variation in the size of net foreign assets to GDP ratio, one distinct pattern is the signiﬁcant growth of
net foreign assets to GDP ratio of the developing countries in recent years. For instance, China’s net foreign assets to GDP ratio
increased from 6.9% in 1999 to +24.3% in 2010, with most of the net foreign assets accumulated in the form of foreign
exchange reserves and new portfolio investment abroad.4 The rise of net foreign assets/GDP is clearly evident in the case of2 See for example Bernanke (2005) and Jen (2007).
3 To take into account the country size, the net foreign assets/GDP series are weighted by each country’s GDP in the group.
4 As of 2006, the position is about 20 percent of GDP. See also Dollar and Kraay (2006) where it is argued that a long-run forecast of China’s NFA position is
around 3–9 percent of its total wealth.
W.M. Chia et al. / Journal of Asian Economics 34 (2014) 42–5344developing countries from the late 1990s onwards, whereas the OECD countries have registered a gradual decline over
the same period. From a theoretical point of view, the observed empirical pattern is quite surprising since the
developing countries have relatively lower capital/labor ratio than the OECD countries, and thus the developing
countries were supposed instead to be a net debtor as a group. Fig. 1B plots the capital/labor ratio (in thousands of 1996
international dollars) as of 19965 against the change in net foreign assets/GDP during 1996–2010. We can see that the
relationship is rather weak or insigniﬁcantly negative, so unlike what the neoclassical growth theory would have
predicted, low capital/labor ratio countries tend to accumulate net foreign assets at the same rate or even faster than the
rest of the world.
Motivated by the signiﬁcant accumulation of net foreign assets in the developing countries and the lack of evidence on
the macroeconomic implications of net foreign asset accumulation in the literature, we aim to empirically examine the
relationship between net foreign assets and some key macroeconomic variables using a large sample of OECD and
developing countries. We then provide a battery of statistics and estimations, taking into account the theoretical
predictions. Using data over three decades, the empirical analysis summarizes several macroeconomic relationships and
studies how the size of net foreign asset affects consumption, real exchange rate, and real interest rate in a cross section of
countries.
Because of the structural differences across countries, we conduct the analysis for the whole sample of countries and
for country groups such as OECD, G7, developing countries, and East Asia covering ASEAN and ASEAN plus China, Japan,
and South Korea or the commonly known ASEAN+3. The disaggregation of countries into OECD and developing
countries accounts for potential inﬂuences of income level and development threshold in the data. In the literature, net
foreign assets of G7 have been studied extensively, for example Ghironi et al. (2008), among others. Our paper adds Asia
and less developed countries, highlighting not only its global importance, but also a presently growing economic
cooperation worldwide. In relation to the net foreign asset accumulation, after the ﬁnancial crisis in the late 1990s,
several countries in Asia have established bilateral swap agreements.6 Kohlscheen and Taylor (2008) note that this type
of swap agreements tends to be associated with correlation of foreign exchange reserve accumulation, a signiﬁcant
part of net foreign assets in East Asia and developing countries. While our study is empirical in nature, we also take
into account as much as possible all these relevant theories, policy and political economy considerations into the
analysis.
To preview our estimation results, we ﬁnd that in the long run there is a convergence in the distribution of net
foreign assets to GDP ratio across countries. However, macroeconomic adjustments found in our study tend to vary
across OECD, G7, developing countries, and East Asia. Based on the benchmark estimation, in the presence of positive
global real economic shocks, if a country raises its accumulation of net foreign assets to GDP by one standard deviation,
this may lead to a higher level of consumption to GDP ratio by 0.02% per year and an appreciation of real exchange rate
by 2% per year in the whole sample of countries. The consumption to GDP response is most responsive in G7 (+0.1 to
+0.2% per year), while the response is negative and rather small in the developing countries (0.02% per year),
consistent with higher private saving rates of developing countries, especially in Asia. We also ﬁnd that the resultant
real exchange rate appreciation tends to be larger in the developing countries (+3% per year) compared to the OECD
countries (0.2% per year), suggesting that real exchange rates in the developing countries may not be overvalued in the
long term given the trend in the net foreign asset accumulation observed during the sample period.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the relationships between the net foreign assets
and macroeconomic adjustments based on theoretical and empirical considerations to be used in the econometric analysis.
Section 3 presents the estimation sample and reports macroeconomic responses to net foreign asset accumulation in the
data. Section 4 discusses the implications of our ﬁndings and concludes.
2. Related studies on net foreign assets and possible macroeconomic implications
This section ﬁrst summarizes the theoretical associations between the size of net foreign assets and some key
macroeconomic variables followed by a description on our empirical approach. Note that our focus is not on questioning
whether a large level of net foreign asset is a source of instability per se [see Henderson and Rogoff (1982)], but instead
mainly on measuring the feedbacks between net foreign asset position and some macroeconomic adjustments across
countries. Tomeasure the size of net foreign assets, we use themost recent data based on Lane andMilesi-Ferretti (2007): net
foreign asset position at time t is calculated from its initial position plus cumulative current account balance and cumulative
net capital gain on country’s cross-border positions.7 Essentially, net foreign assets accumulated in each period differ from
the current account balance by the size of capital gains or valuation change; a country’s net foreign asset position is critically
sensitive to asset price valuation and exchange rate movements. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to account for5 See Caselli and Feyrer (2007) for a detailed estimation of capital to labor ratio across countries.
6 The agreement is the on-going effort to establish a self-managed reserve pool bymultilateralizing the bilateral swaps under the ChiangMai Initiative in
1999. The objective is to manage short-term liquidity among the country members in the event of ﬁnancial crisis, particularly when resources of
international organizations (i.e. IMF) are committed to other countries. For studies on the crises andmanagement of international reserves, see for example
Aizenman, Lee, and Rhee (2007) and Edwards (2009).
7 Note that the initial positions are based on the estimates in Sinn (1990).
W.M. Chia et al. / Journal of Asian Economics 34 (2014) 42–53 45such sensitivity, the measurement issue has important implications. As suggested by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2009) and
Curcuru, Dvorak, andWarnock (2008), the current account deﬁcits of the U.S. may be overestimated by as much as 0.6% per
year when different measurement of net ﬁnancial inﬂows is used.8
Theoretically, the size of net foreign assets in macroeconomic adjustment process can either be exogenous or
endogenous. For instance, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002) take the size of net foreign assets as an exogenous variable and
provide some evidence on how the size of net foreign assets inﬂuences trade balance and real exchange rate. According to
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002), positive steady state net external asset position in a country allows the country to run
persistent trade deﬁcits and hence exchange rate appreciation. Conversely, a country with negative net foreign assets has to
run trade surpluses to service its external liabilities, thereby requiring its exchange rate to depreciate. If a country with
negative net foreign assets has large economic growth and/or realized returns on its foreign assets that are higher than the
payouts on its foreign liabilities, these favorable conditions could then translate into a smaller trade surplus required to
stabilize its negative net foreign asset position.
Alternatively, Masson et al. (1994), Cavallo and Ghironi (2002), Ghironi et al. (2008), and Ghironi (2008) consider net
foreign asset as an endogenous variable in themacroeconomic adjusting process. For example, Ghironi et al. (2008) examine
how the consumption dynamics in the G7 countries is related to a country’s size of net foreign assets, when net foreign assets
are endogenously determined. In this account, global economic system comprises countries with different discount factors,
giving rise to non-zero steady-state net foreign assets. As a result, there are gains from asset trade due to different
discounting of future utility across countries. In response to positive global productivity shocks, the relatively patient
country accumulates assets and its per capita consumption rises.
Our empirical approach nests together themacroeconomic variables based on the abovementioned studies.We provide a
battery of statistics and regressions to study the adjustment of consumption, real exchange rate, and real interest rate,
considering net foreign asset position as endogenously determined, and examine how thesemacroeconomic variables adjust
in the presence of global economic shocks. In proceeding to the analysis, one issue is whether we should normalize net
foreign asset position by aggregate output or GDP (as in Lane & Milesi-Ferretti, 2002), or by population (as in Ghironi et al.,
2008). Because the current account sustainability is related in part to the economy size,9 we normalize net foreign asset and
consumption series by GDP. Our hypothesis is whether, in the presence of positive global economic shocks, a net foreign
asset accumulation of relatively more patient country is associated with its consumption to GDP ratio, increasing more
slowly with its real exchange rate appreciating more quickly.10 Empirical tests are performed on 66 countries in which we
have the data, as well as separately on several country groups, including OECD, G7, developing countries, ASEAN, among
others.
3. Estimating macroeconomic adjustment to net foreign asset accumulation
3.1. Sample
Subject to data availability, we collect the information on relevant macroeconomic covariates. The collection of data
covers 177 countries, spanning 1981–2010.11 The data are at annual frequency based on various statistical sources: net
foreign assets from the External Wealth of Nations database (Lane & Milesi-Ferretti, 2007) and International Investment
Positions (IMF); consumption, real exchange rates, real interest rates, trade balance, ﬁscal balance, GDP, age dependency
from World Development Indicators (World Bank); GDP growth and population growth from World Economic Outlook
(IMF); global real economic activity shocks from Kilian (2009); and S&P500 implied volatility from Chicago Board Options
Exchange.8 See also Gourinchas and Rey (2007) on the relationship between current accounts (ﬂow) and the net foreign assets (stock), as well as Helbling, Batini,
and Cardarelli (2008).
9 Aizenman and Sun (2010) ﬁnd that, with the exception of the US, the length of current account deﬁcit spells is negatively related to the relative size of
the countries’ GDP.
10 These considerations are also drawn from the literature on the current account sustainability, including for example Boileau and Normandin (2008) on
real interest rate differentials, and Lee and Chinn (2006) on real exchange rates.
11 Aruba, Afghanistan, Angola, Albania, United Arab Emirates, Argentina, Armenia, Antigua and Barbuda, Australia#, Austria#, Azerbaijan, Burundi,
Belgium#, Benin, Burkina Faso, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Bahrain, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Belarus, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam+, Bhutan,
Botswana, Central African Republic, Canada#*, Switzerland#, Chile#, China+, Cote d’Ivoire, Cameroon, Congo, Dem. Rep., Congo, Rep., Colombia, Comoros,
Cape Verde, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czech Republic#, Germany#*, Djibouti, Dominica, Denmark#, Dominican Republic, Algeria, Ecuador, Egypt, Arab Rep., Eritrea,
Spain#, Estonia#, Ethiopia, Finland#, Fiji, France#*, Gabon, United Kingdom#*, Georgia, Ghana, Guinea, Gambia, The, Guinea-Bissau, Greece#, Grenada,
Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Croatia, Haiti, Hungary#, Indonesia+, India, Ireland#, Iran, Islamic Rep., Iraq, Israel#, Italy#*, Jamaica, Jordan, Japan#*+,
Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyz Republic, Cambodia+, Kiribati, St. Kitts and Nevis, Korea, Rep.#+, Kosovo, Kuwait, Lao PDR+, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, St. Lucia, Sri
Lanka, Lesotho, Lithuania, Luxembourg#, Latvia, Macao SAR, China, Morocco, Moldova, Madagascar, Maldives, Mexico#, Macedonia, FYR, Mali, Malta,
Myanmar+, Montenegro, Mongolia, Mozambique, Mauritania, Mauritius, Malawi, Malaysia+, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Nicaragua, Netherlands#, Norway#,
Nepal, New Zealand#, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines+, Papua New Guinea, Poland#, Portugal#, Paraguay, Qatar, Romania, Russian Federation,
Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Senegal, Singapore+, Solomon Islands, Sierra Leone, El Salvador, Serbia, Sao Tome and Principe, Suriname, Slovak Republic#,
Slovenia#, Sweden#, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Chad, Togo, Thailand+, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia,
Turkey#, Tanzania, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay, United States#*, Uzbekistan, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Venezuela, RB, Vietnam+, Vanuatu, Samoa,
Yemen, Rep., South Africa, Zimbabwe [# OECD countries; * G7 countries; + ASEAN plus 3 countries].
Table 1
Net foreign assets/GDP and macroeconomic variables.
Period NFA/GDP Consumption/GDP Real exchange rate Real interest rate
Whole sample
1982–1989 .028 .771 2.491 .053
1990–1999 .051 .768 .985 .062
2000–2010 .058 .763 .993 .036
OECD countries
1982–1989 .015 .800 1.048 .059
1990–1999 .033 .788 1.014 .057
2000–2010 .076 .799 1.002 .028
G7
1982–1989 .015 .817 1.067 .061
1990–1999 .007 .798 1.028 .057
2000–2010 .031 .816 1.006 .030
G7 excluding USA
1982–1989 .023 .780 .987 .055
1990–1999 .040 .767 1.068 .057
2000–2010 .103 .780 .998 .026
Developing countries
1982–1989 .091 .629 10.509 .023
1990–1999 .145 .666 .830 .081
2000–2010 .008 .642 .939 .068
ASEAN+3 countries
1982–1989 .006 .728 .996 .045
1990–1999 .082 .698 1.118 .040
2000–2010 .239 .669 1.044 .028
ASEAN
1982–1989 .318 .645 .529 .050
1990–1999 .280 .636 1.036 .072
2000–2010 .017 .664 1.021 .036
China, Japan, S. Korea
1982–1989 .042 .736 1.046 .045
1990–1999 .118 .704 1.125 .037
2000–2010 .265 .669 1.045 .027
Source: WDI, IIP, WEO, EWN, and Authors’ calculation.
This table reports net foreign assets (NFA) and consumption (relative to GDP), and the level of real exchange rate and real interest rate. All variables for each
country group are GDP-weighted.
W.M. Chia et al. / Journal of Asian Economics 34 (2014) 42–5346Table 1 reports for each time period the group averages (GDP weighted) of the macroeconomic variables. After
constructing lags for the variables of interests (net foreign asset to GDP ratio, consumption to GDP ratio, real exchange rate,
and real interest rate), we keep countries with at least 10 annual observations. 66 countries pass this ﬁltering for the
empirical analysis. Themarked trend is the decline of net foreign assets to GDP of the OECD andG7 countries, while the trend
is increasing for the developing countries as discussed earlier in Fig. 1, drivenmainly by China, Japan, and South Korea.When
the US is excluded from the G7 group, the trend of the net foreign assets to GDP ratio is increasing over this period. For the
ASEAN countries, while the net foreign assets to GDP ratio stays negative for a large span of the sample period, this ratio has
turned positive in the 2000s. Real exchange rate appreciation is also observed in Asia driven by high GDPweights of the plus-
three countries in this grouping. Real interest rates have in general declined in the 2000s, reﬂecting the great moderation in
the ﬁrst half of the decade.12 The patterns of these macroeconomic variables suggest that each country group experiences a
unique adjustment of its own, inﬂuenced by structural differences, economy size, level of income and development
threshold. As a result, we attempt to account for these structural differences using various estimation techniques and
alternative speciﬁcations, and present the estimation results by different country groupings.
Table 2A reports the correlations of the variables in our sample. These correlations are based on de-trended
macroeconomic series. Note that given the data are at annual frequency in an unbalanced panel, we proceed with a simple
linear de-trending. The correlations are ﬁrst calculated for each country pair in the corresponding regional group, and then12 We have also examined the mean of these variables for ﬁxed and ﬂexible exchange rate countries. Consumption/GDP ratio tends to be more volatile
under the ﬁxed exchange rate regimes, whereas the opposite applies to net foreign assets to GDP ratio and real interest rates. However, the preliminary
statistics suggest no distinct pattern on the macro dynamics between the two groups. Nonetheless, while beyond the scope of this study, the effects of
exchange rate regimes, and possibly inﬂation targeting on the accumulation of net foreign assetswarrant further analysis. See also Chinn andWei (2008) for
a case of current account adjustments. The challenge, however, is to categorize countries according to their exchange rate ﬂexibility across time periods.
Table 2A
Sample correlations.
Variables NFA/GDP Consumption/GDP Real exchange rate
Consumption/GDP 0.1783*
Real exchange rate 0.2218* 0.0689*
Real interest rate 0.0593 0.0464 0.2251*
Source: WDI, IIP, WEO, EWN, and Authors’ calculation.
This table reports sample correlations.
* Statistical signiﬁcance at 5 percent level.
Table 2B
Cross correlations.
Region Variable
NFA/GDP Consumption/GDP Real exchange rate Real interest rate
OECD .002 .137 .066 .143
G7 .075 .162 .113 .094
Developing .054 .021 .107 .092
ASEAN + 3 .260 .105 .222 .121
ASEAN .221 .079 .607 .254
China, Japan, S. Korea .358 .174 .354 .131
Source: WDI, IIP, WEO, EWN, and Authors’ calculation.
This table provides a cross-correlation of macroeconomic variables for each country group.
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associated with net foreign assets to GDP ratio. To empirically examine whether these correlations are the product of
regional economic interdependence such as a ‘de-coupling’ debate in Kose, Otrok, and Prasad (2008), Table 2B provides the
cross-correlation of these variables for each country group. As shown, the cross-correlation of net foreign assets to GDP
ratio is higher and positive in ASEAN+3, particularly among China, Japan, and South Korea, than we can observe in other
country groups. After the 1997 Asian ﬁnancial crisis, Asian countries have established various bilateral swap agreements,
which may help explain this pattern. Kohlscheen and Taylor (2008) provide some evidence that these swap agreements
take into account the correlation of foreign reserve level among the participating members. We also note that the cross-
correlations of consumption are small for all the country groups, seemingly consistent with the notion of international
consumption correlation puzzle [see Backus, Kehoe, & Kydland, 1992]. Higher correlations of real interest rates among the
OECD countries and among the ASEAN countries may reﬂect a tighter ﬁnancial integration between countries in these
regional groupings.
3.2. Empirical speciﬁcation
Ourempirical analysisproceedsﬁrstwithabaselineadjustmentofnet foreignassets toGDPratio, consumption toGDP ratio,
real exchange rate, and real interest rate, all considered as endogenously determined in a system over the sample period. We
then introduce real andﬁnancial shocks at a global level, in order tomeasure the inﬂuence that net foreign assets toGDPhas on
other macroeconomic variables in the presence of these global shocks. Essentially, we want to understand whether
macroeconomic responses in the presence of global economic shocks are dependent on the level of net foreign assets to GDP
ratio in the data. We consider two global economic shocks: a real shock and a ﬁnancial shock. For the real shock, we use the
global real economic activity shock of Kilian (2009); this index is a measure of worldwide real economic activity in global
industrial commoditymarkets. For the ﬁnancial shock,we use S&P500 implied volatility index, compiled by the Chicago Board
of Exchange (CBOE)13; this index measures the expectation of volatility in the ﬁnancial markets over the next 30-day period.
As shown in Fig. 2A, negative global real shocks can be observed throughout the 1980s and the 1990s, whereas the 2000s
witnessed positive shocks that began from 2002 onwards. For the ﬁnancial shocks, we can see in Fig. 2B that the late 1980s,
late 1990s, and late 2000s were dominated by high global volatility. In the data, we ﬁnd that these global shocks are
contemporaneously and negatively correlated for most of the periods.14
To purge out cyclical variation inmacroeconomic variables, we de-trend themacro series in our sample. In order to verify
that all variables in our estimation have the same order of integration, we apply panel unit root test of Maddala and Wu
(1999) to net foreign assets to GDP ratio, consumption to GDP ratio, real exchange rate, and real interest rate series, and apply13 Instead of VIX, which is frequently followed in the media, we use a related VXO index, which has a longer time span for our empirical analysis.
14 Similar ﬁnding is found at the monthly frequency.
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Fig. 2.Global real and ﬁnancial shocks. The real shocks aremeasured by theworld-wide real economic activity index (Kilian, 2009). The ﬁnancial shocks are
measured by the implied volatility index in S&P 500.
Source: WDI, IIP, WEO, EWN, and Authors’ calculation.
W.M. Chia et al. / Journal of Asian Economics 34 (2014) 42–5348Phillips-Perron test to the global real and ﬁnancial shocks series.15 Table 3 reports the p-values of the tests under the null of
unit root. As shown, the global real and ﬁnancial shock series appear to be non-stationary at 5% level, so we use the ﬁrst-
difference of these two variables (which are stationary, as reported in the second column of Table 3) in our formal estimation.
Let Bt denote net foreign asset to GDP ratio at time t, Ct consumption to GDP ratio, Qt real exchange rate, Rt real interest
rate, and Zt global shock. We consider the following multivariate regression:
Yit ¼ Yi
0
t1b
i
B þFij þ eij;t (1)
where Yit ¼ fBt;Ct;Qt;Rtg andFij is a set of country ﬁxed effects. This estimation is closely related to a vector autoregression
(VAR), being applied in a panel. The multivariate system regresses each of the dependent variables on the same set of lagged
regressors and imposes a constraint that their coefﬁcient estimates do not differ across panels. This way, our speciﬁcation
considers all the variables as endogenously determined and allows not only persistence in the macro time-series, but also
cross-country difference in the data.
3.3. Estimation results
Panel A of Table 4 reports our baseline estimation for the whole sample of countries. We ﬁnd that net foreign assets to
GDP has a positive associationwith its own lag, suggesting the persistence of the series; similar persistency can also be found
in all the other three variables. As shown in the table, lagged net foreign assets to GDP is positively associated with real
exchange rate appreciation. As a macroeconomic adjustment in countries with positive net foreign assets (net creditor) may
differ from countries with negative net foreign assets (net debtor), panels A and B of Fig. 3 probes into this difference by15 We use Maddala–Wu test since it does not require a balanced panel data as the Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003) and Levin, Lin, and James Chu (2002) tests.
Based on the p-values of individual unit root tests, this test assumes that all series are non-stationary under the null hypothesis against the alternative that
at least one series in the panel is stationary.
Table 3
Non-stationarity of macroeconomic variables.
Variables Level Difference
Maddala–Wu panel unit-root test (p-values)
Net foreign assets/GDP .0028 .0000
Consumption/GDP .0001 .0000
Real exchange rate .0004 .0000
Real interest rate .0000 .0000
Phillips-Perron unit-root test (p-values)
Global real shocks .2093 .0000
Global ﬁnancial shocks .0390 .0000
Source: WDI, IIP, WEO, EWN, and Authors’ calculation.
This table reports p-values fromunit-root tests based on theMaddala–Wu (1999)’s procedure (under the null that all panels are
nonstationary) and the Phillips-Perron (1988)’s procedure (under the null that the series is nonstationary).
Table 4
Baseline macroeconomic adjustment in a sample of 66 countries.
(A) Whole sample
Endogenous variables in a multivariable system NFA/GDPt Consumption/GDPt Real exchange ratet Real interest ratet
est. s.e. sig. est. s.e. sig. est. s.e. sig. est. s.e. sig.
NFA/GDPt1 .796 .019
*** .001 .005 .116 .025 *** .014 .014
Consumption/GDPt1 .288 .068
*** .769 .018 *** .023 .089 .082 .051
Real exchange ratet1 .071 .018 *** .003 .005 .537 .024 *** .069 .014 ***
Real interest ratet1 .091 .035 *** .020 .009 ** .168 .045 *** .359 .026 ***
R-squared .603 .601 .359 .185
(B) Comparing net creditors (NFA> 0) and net debtors (NFA< 0)
Endogenous variables NFA/GDPt Consumption/GDPt Real exchange ratet Real interest ratet
est. s.e. sig. est. s.e. sig. est. s.e. sig. est. s.e. sig.
NFAt1> 0 NFA/GDPt1 .846 .035
*** .009 .009 .144 .042 *** .012 .024
Consumption/GDPt1 .140 .105 .823 .028
*** .066 .127 .051 .070
Real exchange ratet1 .032 .025 .009 .007 .412 .030 *** .020 .017
Real interest ratet1 .065 .056 .007 .015 .383 .068 *** .682 .038 ***
NFAt1< 0 NFA/GDPt1 .799 .031
*** .027 .008 *** .070 .038 * .006 .021
Consumption/GDPt1 .310 .117
*** .710 .031 *** .026 .142 .105 .078
Real exchange ratet1 .144 .038 *** .001 .010 .779 .046 *** .050 .026 *
Real interest ratet1 .062 .053 .026 .014 * .079 .064 .067 .035 *
R-squared .560 .552 .378 .264
Source: WDI, IIP, WEO, EWN, and Authors’ calculation.
This table reports estimation results from amultivariate systemwhere all four macroeconomic variables are endogenously determined. The sample period
is 1980–2010, covering 1366 country-year observations.
* Statistical signiﬁcance at 10 percent level.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at 5 percent level.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at 1 percent level.
W.M. Chia et al. / Journal of Asian Economics 34 (2014) 42–53 49plotting empirical distribution of net foreign assets to GDP for the 5-year average from 2006 to 2010. While negative net
foreign asset positions may not constitute an independent source of macroeconomic instability [Henderson & Rogoff, 1982],
a few countrieswith very large negative or positive positions should be considered outliers. To verify these potential extreme
observations, panel C of Fig. 3 also plots the kernel density estimates of the cross-sectional distribution for each time period.
We can see a medium-run decline in the dispersion net foreign assets to GDP from the 1980s to early 2000s. The kernel
density is similar to that of a normal distribution, and majority of the sample observations are within the [50%, +50%]
boundary.16 These ﬁgures provide supportive evidence that our sample of net foreign assets to GDP is representative in terms
of the net foreign asset position across countries over the study period.
Next, our estimation takes into account a difference between positive versus negative net foreign assets to GDP across
countries. Panel B of Table 4 reports coefﬁcient estimates using net foreign assets to GDP of 0 as a cutoff. Focusing on the
effects of the lagged net foreign assets to GDP on the other three variables, the difference of coefﬁcient estimates between net
creditors and net debtors shows up signiﬁcantly in the case of consumption to GDP ratio and real exchange rate appreciation.16 Five percent of the sample observations have NFA/GDP (de-trended) below 50%. The kernel is that of Epanechnikov.
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W.M. Chia et al. / Journal of Asian Economics 34 (2014) 42–5350For both net creditors and net debtors, an increase in net foreign assets to GDP ratio is positively associated with real
exchange rate appreciation. Interestingly, the increase of net foreign assets to GDP raises consumption to GDP only for net
debtors, the ﬁndingwhich is consistentwith a notion that creditor country tends to bemore patient in terms of consumption
than the debtor country.
We now introduce the global economic shocks into our system of estimation. This allows us to examine how the
macroeconomic adjustments in the presence of the global shocks are dependent on the position of net foreign assets to GDP.
Table 5 reports ourmain results, tabulating coefﬁcient estimates of lagged net foreign assets to GDP for the entire sample and
across country groups. Using the global real shocks in our estimation, we ﬁnd that the accumulation of net foreign assets to
GDP is positively associated with consumption to GDP for OECD, G7 excluding the U.S., China, Japan, South Korea group, and
net debtor countries. For the real exchange rate appreciation, its positive association with net foreign assets to GDP
accumulation is found for the whole sample, developing countries, and non-extreme observations.
Althoughweﬁnd thatmacroeconomic variables in OECD, G7, developing countries and ASEAN display different dynamics
in the presence of global shocks, some patterns have also emerged from the data. By and large, the accumulation of net
foreign assets is associated with lower consumption and appreciation of real exchange rate in the countries studied. For the
real interest rate, we do not detect any signiﬁcant associationwith the net foreign assets to GDP.17 In terms of inter-temporal
adjustment, a country with a large level of negative net foreign asset position relative to its GDP (debtor country) must
eventually service its liabilities by running trade surpluses, which requires real exchange rate depreciation; this adjustment
process may take place through a depreciation of nominal exchange rate and/or a lower domestic price level relative to
foreign prices. On the other hand, a creditor countrymay run trade deﬁcits, which results in real exchange rate appreciation.
Qualitatively, the empirical evidence seems to be consistent with the theoretical explanation.
To gauge the economic signiﬁcance of our coefﬁcient estimates, we calculate the extent to which consumption and real
exchange rate are inﬂuenced by net foreign assets to GDP. We look at the effect of a one-standard deviation increase in net17 This ﬁnding on real interest rate is also in line with Ghironi et al. (2008) where in the model of US and other G7 countries the response of real interest
rate is not statistically different from zero.
Table 5
Effects of net foreign assets/GDP in the presence of global economic shocks.
Variable Consumption/GDP Real exchange rate Real interest rate
Region est. s.e. sig. est. s.e. sig. est. s.e. sig.
(A) Real shocks
Whole sample .001 .005 .116 .025 *** .012 .014
OECD .010 .005 ** .016 .020 .023 .010 **
G7 .019 .012 .065 .080 .015 .017
G7 excluding US .025 .013 * .045 .082 .021 .018
Developing countries .001 .007 .152 .036 *** .012 .021
ASEAN + 3 .002 .007 .014 .051 .027 .021
ASEAN .001 .008 .025 .048 .020 .028
China, Japan, Korea .043 .021 ** .310 .248 .057 .048
NFA = [.5, .5] .019 .005 *** .117 .026 *** .014 .015
NFA> 0 .009 .009 .077 .061 .009 .024
NFA< 0 .020 .008 *** .015 .023 .010 .025
(B) Financial shocks
Whole sample .003 .005 .055 .016 *** .008 .015
OECD .010 .005 ** .000 .020 .017 .011
G7 .023 .014 * .041 .083 .012 .019
G7 excluding US .028 .015 * .045 .089 .019 .019
Developing countries .005 .007 .069 .022 *** .012 .022
ASEAN+3 .003 .007 .006 .049 .020 .021
ASEAN .002 .008 .001 .048 .004 .026
China, Japan, Korea .038 .023 * .089 .239 .035 .051
NFA = [.5, .5] .018 .005 *** .059 .017 *** .010 .015
NFA> 0 .013 .009 .067 .034 ** .012 .023
NFA< 0 .019 .007 ** .019 .022 .011 .027
Source: WDI, IIP, WEO, EWN, and Authors’ calculation.
The estimation is multivariate regression, including country ﬁxed effects and time trend (coefﬁcient estimates not reported).
* Statistical signiﬁcance at 10 percent level.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at 5 percent level.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at 1 percent level.
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Fig. 4. Economic signiﬁcance of net foreign assets onmacroeconomic variables. This ﬁgure plots empirical response of consumption/GDP and real exchange
rate to one standard deviation increase of net foreign assets/GDP.
Source: WDI, IIP, WEO, EWN, and Authors’ calculation.
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W.M. Chia et al. / Journal of Asian Economics 34 (2014) 42–5352foreign assets to GDP on these two variables and report our calculation in Fig. 4. Based on the coefﬁcient estimates in Table 5,
the economic signiﬁcance of net foreign assets to GDP accumulation is calculated by multiplying its coefﬁcient estimate on
real exchange rate and consumption by its one standard deviation. We repeat this calculation for each country groups
accordingly. For instance, the whole sample’s coefﬁcient estimate of net foreign assets to GDP on real exchange rate is 0.116;
one standard deviation of net foreign assets to GDP is 0.167, or 16.7 percent of GDP; therefore the economic signiﬁcance of
one-standard deviation increase of net foreign assets to GDP on real exchange rate is 0.116 0.167 = 0.019, or about 2
percent annually. We can see that the economic signiﬁcance of net foreign asset accumulation on real exchange rate is
strongest on the developing countries, and a group of large countries in Asia (China, Japan, South Korea). The economic
signiﬁcance of net foreign assets to GDP on consumption to GDP is largest in G7 and the OECD countries, butmuch smaller in
other country groups.
A distinct pattern in our ﬁndings is that the net foreign assets to GDP effect on the real exchange rate appreciation is the
most economically signiﬁcant in countries with positive net foreign asset position. We ﬁnd that the accumulation of net
foreign assets to GDP by a further one-standard deviation is associated with 1.2 percent annual real appreciation for the
creditor country, whereas it is only 0.2 percent for the debtor country. The economic signiﬁcance of net foreign assets to GDP
on consumption to GDP portrays a rather different picture: increasing net foreign assets to GDP by one standard deviation
raises consumption to GDP by 0.3 percent annually for the debtor country, but only 0.14 percent for the creditor country.
Since our estimation is done on an annual basis, adding up these effects of net foreign assets to GDP over a decade implies a
non-negligible macroeconomic adjustment that is both quantitatively and economically signiﬁcant across countries.
4. Concluding remarks
This study analyses the relationship between net foreign asset accumulation and the adjustment of consumption, real
exchange rate, and real interest rate. Our sample focuses on OECD, G7, developing countries, and East Asia, over the 1980–
2010 periods. On average,we ﬁnd that the accumulation of net foreign assets to GDP is associatedwith lower consumption to
GDP and larger real appreciation. Based on our baseline estimation, in the presence of positive global real economic shocks, if
a country raises its accumulation of net foreign assets to GDP by a one-standard deviation, this is associated with a higher
level of consumption to GDP by 0.02% per year and an appreciation of real exchange rate by 2% per year in the whole sample
of countries. Consumption to GDP respondsmore positively in G7 (+0.1 to +0.2% per year), while the response is negative and
rather small in developing countries (0.02% per year). The adjustment of real exchange rate appreciation tends to be large in
developing countries (+3% per year) but relatively smaller in OECD (0.2% per year).
Possible extension may delve further into the accumulation of net foreign assets by types of the ﬁnancial assets, e.g.
portfolio investment and others, considering also a contemporaneous correlation between domestic ﬁnancial markets and
the global capitalmarkets.18 It would also be useful to also look into the role of economic size, the informal sector, population
composition (total and working age), private and public net foreign assets (i.e. sovereign wealth funds), as well as the role of
ﬂexible and ﬁxed exchange rate regimes (i.e. the Euro area, dollarization) on the correlation between macroeconomic
adjustment and the accumulation of net foreign assets across countries.
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